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8 Blue and yellow makes green?
Ecological modernization in Swedish 
climate policy
Paul Tobin
Introduction
Climate change increases distributional conflicts, creates tension between policy 
objectives, and challenges the viability of the existing dominant economic model 
(Gough and Meadowcroft 2011: 493–95). Eckersley (2004: 91) argues that “[g]
iven the seriousness and urgency of [climate change] … building on the state 
governance structures that already exist seems to be a more fruitful path to take” 
than dissolving the existing patchwork quilt of states. A green state builds on 
existing capitalist structures and adds environmental principles to the core 
aim of the state (ibid.: 83). At the formation of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, 23 states, all capitalist, 
were identified as ‘developed,’ thus sharing the greatest responsibility to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (UNFCCC 2014a). Sweden is one of the 23 states and 
has frequently been identified as a pioneer regarding its environmental policies 
(Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000; Lundqvist 2004) and its climate legislation 
(Friberg 2008; Burck et al. 2009). Thus, if any state may be considered a green 
state regarding climate change, it is likely to be Sweden. However, being a relative 
leader is not the same as becoming a green state.
Meadowcroft (2005) argued that it would be at least 15 to 20 years before a green 
state would be realized. To avoid the two degree increase in global temperatures, 
identified as the maximum change the world can endure, however, states must 
adopt the properties of the green state much sooner. According to Christoff’s 
(2005) typology of states’ environmental performance, Sweden was classified as 
only one ‘level’ short of being defined as a green state in 2005. In 2006, Sweden 
saw a change in government from the traditionally dominant Social Democrats 
(Socialdemokraterna) to the Conservative/Liberal Alliance (Alliansen) of four 
center-right parties (Aylott and Bolin 2007: 621). I use Christoff’s typology to 
analyze the new government’s response to climate change during its first term 
of office, until 2010, and ask whether Sweden evolved to become a green state. 
Climate policy has been selected for exploration as climate change arguably 
represents the greatest current environmental threat (DiMento and Doughman 
2007), yet has been neglected in the current green state literature.
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To become a green state, it is increasingly argued that a state must exhibit the 
characteristics of ecological modernization (EM) (see also Eckersley 2004; Barry 
and Eckersley 2005; Christoff 2005; Meadowcroft 2005). For Christoff (2005: 
41) strong EM must be present in a green state, which is EM in combination with 
biocentric values. As such, this chapter will begin by outlining the theoretical 
foundations of EM and the green state. Next, a cursory methodology of how to 
measure whether Sweden was a green state will be developed. The bulk of this 
chapter assesses how the Alliance government dealt with four key climate policy 
areas during 2006–10, according to the principles of strong EM. The primacy of 
the policy areas – overall emissions reductions, renewable energy production, 
energy efficiency, and renewable transport development – is evident as they are 
prioritized in the four headline goals of Sweden’s 2009 Energy Bill, which was 
the standout piece of legislation during the Conservative/Liberal Alliance’s first 
term of office. Finally, it will be argued that Sweden did not become a green state 
during the period studied, but instead continued to be what Christoff (2005) has 
termed an ‘ecological welfare state’: sufficiently ambitious to be a global leader, 
but not a green state regarding climate change.
Ecological modernization and the green state
Ecological modernization is presented as a means by which capitalism can 
accommodate the environmental challenge (Chapter 1, this volume; Gouldson 
and Murphy 1997: 75). Due to the reliance of EM on the market, the concept 
has been seen as a tacit endorsement of pre-existing economic inequalities 
(Eckersley 2000: 239). Additionally, as the paradigm seeks to improve efficiency, 
rather than reduce overall consumption, environmental degradation is almost 
certain to occur; “[i]n short, it seeks more environmentally efficient ways of 
expanding output” (Barry and Eckersley 2005: 262). Expansion of output is 
clearly incompatible with mitigating climate change. EM has been described 
as ineffective for transboundary issues because economies are not transformed 
as much as polluting industries are simply relocated to states with weaker 
environmental legislation (Schnaiberg et al. 2002: 21). Moreover, according 
to Davidson (2012: 32) and Gouldson and Murphy (1997), the presumption 
that sufficiently effective technology will be developed is technologically 
deterministic, necessitating that a degree of biocentrism is at least partly employed 
in order to avoid drastic resource shortages, and transform weak EM into strong 
EM (Christoff 2005). Biocentrism emphasizes equality between the species by 
challenging assumptions of anthropocentrism; all aspects of nature are argued to 
possess an inherent value, regardless of their utility to humanity (Taylor 1981; 
Sterba 2011). Thus, policies that protect the environment because of its intrinsic 
value, rather than instrumental benefits for humanity, will be seen as biocentric. 
This chapter therefore posits that if a country is to become a green state, policies 
reflecting the principles of strong EM must be developed.
For Eckersley (2004: 3), the green state is a normative idea as well as a 
theoretical framework, and thus she helps us conceptualize how states ‘should’ 
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act in order to achieve sustainability. Yet while localized issues may be more 
easily addressed by the state, transboundary challenges such as climate change 
require a green state that is willing to pursue policy solutions for both localized 
and international environmental challenges (Meadowcroft 2005: 5). Although 
climate change may be complex, its high-profile status draws greater awareness 
to environmental threats, and has pushed the environment up the political 
agenda. Eckersley (2004: 169) acknowledges that the green state she theorized 
may never be finalized, because of inherent conflicts between environmental and 
developmental priorities. Christoff (2005: 44) argues that states which almost 
exhibit the necessary criteria for being a green state – namely ‘environmental 
welfare states’ – “engage in weak ecological modernization,” of which an 
example was Sweden, alongside Netherlands. They have already achieved a high 
commitment to human welfare environmentalism, underpinned by moderate 
budgetary commitment and state capacity regarding ecological issues (ibid.: 40). 
Therefore, in order to minimize the inherent weaknesses within EM described 
above, a state must develop a high commitment to biocentric values (i.e. strong 
EM; ibid.: 41).
Methodology
‘Environmental policy’ concerns many areas of a state’s activity, such as 
biodiversity protection, air and water pollution mitigation, and the minimization 
of greenhouse gases, among others. As such, determining whether Sweden may 
be considered a green state across all of these areas is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Climate policy is not a proxy for the green state, but rather a single – yet 
highly significant – constituent part and has been selected because of the many 
threats posed by climate change if left unchecked (DiMento and Doughman 
2007). More specifically, the four headline policy areas identified within the 2009 
Energy Bill are examined, as their prominence in the Bill demonstrates their 
significance to climate change mitigation. While it is unlikely that any state 
would become a green state in the space of one term of government, Christoff’s 
(2005) identification of Sweden as an environmental welfare state suggests that 
if any state made the transition during 2006–10, it would be Sweden.
I share Christoff’s (2005) argument that in order for a state to be considered 
a green state, it must exhibit the features of strong EM. Therefore, this chapter 
interprets EM as a means of technological adjustment in narrow terms, and so EM 
is assumed to be inadequate for a green state. Thus, for Sweden to be considered a 
green state, it must have employed not only the pro-capitalist and pro-technology 
principles of EM, but also a biocentric concern for nature in its own right (Sterba 
2011; Taylor 1981). In order to be a green state, overall consumption levels and 
the production of greenhouse gases must not merely be made more efficient, but 
reduced in absolute terms (Eckersley 2004: 76).
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Swedish climate policy
Sweden has long been seen as an environmental leader (cf. Chapter 9, this 
volume), having been the first state in the world to create an Environmental 
Protection Agency in 1967. By 2006, Sweden had halved greenhouse gas 
emissions from electricity and district heating since the 1970s, thanks in part to 
an energy portfolio dominated by hydropower (45%) and nuclear energy (44%) 
(Regeringskansliet 2009: 20–21; Sarasini 2009: 639). Electricity production 
was almost carbon-free by the start of the period under investigation, reflecting 
Sweden’s pioneering approach to climate change. Sweden was found to be the 
most ambitious state in the world in 2009 for its climate policy (Burck et al. 
2009).
In 2006 there was a change in government from the traditionally dominant 
Social Democratic Party to a center-right coalition that remained in power 
throughout the period covered in this chapter, before being replaced by a minority 
Social Democrat government in September 2014. The willingness of the center-
right parties to co-operate as a new Conservative/Liberal Alliance was a shift in 
Swedish politics. In June 2006, the Alliance agreed a common position on energy 
policy, which ended the Centre Party’s long-held opposition to nuclear power 
(Aylott and Bolin 2007: 626). The Alliance won the 2006 election comfortably, 
becoming the first surplus majority coalition government in Sweden since 1981 
(Widfeldt 2007: 1118). Even prior to the election of the more pro-market Alliance 
in 2006, climate change had already begun to be seen as a means of providing 
economic development in Sweden and not just a constraint on existing lifestyles. 
Political parties across the spectrum were building a narrative that “more and 
more construct[ed] climate change as an Opportunity rather than a Sacrifice” 
(Lundqvist 2004: 104). The chapter will assess four policy areas to determine the 
extent to which the principles of EM and biocentrism have been married.
Overall emissions reductions
The Social Democrats, in government until 2006, demonstrated a strong 
commitment to both environmental protection and economic growth, with 
an ambitious overall greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for 2020 of 25 
percent from a 1990 baseline. The Coalition Government built on the ambition 
of Energy Bills passed in 2002 and 2006 and raised this target considerably, 
to a world-leading 40 percent in the 2009 Energy Bill. The 40 percent target 
related to emissions produced outside the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, in 
sectors such as housing, transport and waste (Regeringskansliet 2009: 2). “The 
former opposition, now in government, here seemed to have higher ambitions 
(40 percent versus 25 percent) than the former Social Democratic government” 
(Zannakis 2009: 118).
The bold increase from 25 percent to 40 percent may initially suggest that the 
Conservative/Liberal Alliance was demonstrating much greater climate ambition 
than both its Social Democrat predecessor and contemporary governments 
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around the world (UNFCCC 2014b). Yet Zannakis (2009: 118) notes that while 
the 25 percent target of the Social Democrat government referred to greenhouse 
gas reductions made purely in Sweden, one third of the Alliance’s 40 percent 
target could be met by flexible mechanisms, such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). CDM and JI are market 
based emissions reductions tools, whereby CDM refers to the funding of emissions 
reductions in developing states, and JI encompasses joint projects between two 
developed states (UNFCCC 2014c). The ability to use CDM or JI to meet the 
40 percent target was not well-received by opposition parties, the Church or 
environmental groups, as it was seen as a disincentive to the development of 
more radical domestic policies (Zannakis 2009: 119). The perception of the 
Alliance was that policy-makers must make ambitious goals, but that these must 
be affordable to the Swedish population in the short term and not facilitate a loss 
of industry to states with less strict emissions goals.
By enabling investments via JI or CDM to count towards the state’s 40 percent 
target, Sweden only slightly increased its overall target for domestic emissions 
reductions. Indeed, under the EU’s ‘burden-sharing agreement’ as part of the 
Kyoto Protocol, those states that failed to meet their emissions reductions goals 
were required to make up for the remaining emissions via JI and CDM. The 
instruments were thus associated with less radical attempts to reduce emissions, 
and were seen by some as not counting towards ‘genuine’ emissions reductions. 
As such, the inclusion of flexible mechanisms reflected a paradigm shift regarding 
attitudes towards climate change in Sweden. Zannakis (2009: 150) argues that, 
“[t]he shift of Government in 2006 … slightly marked Swedish climate policy, 
which is manifested in the Climate Commission report from 2008” that led to 
the Energy Bill of 2009. This ‘slightly marked’ change of approach reflected 
movement towards the greater flexibility and market assumptions of EM. Such a 
change was in keeping with the more market-friendly ideologies of the Coalition 
Government.
In sum therefore, it must be remembered that the 40 percent goal, despite 
including flexible mechanisms, equated to a 26.6 percent reduction in domestic 
emissions, which was greater than the 25 percent reduction goal introduced by 
the Social Democrats, and still placed Sweden at the forefront of global climate 
policies. The geographical location of reductions makes little difference to a 
transboundary issue such as climate change, in which catastrophic climate change 
may only be prevented if global emissions levels are reduced. However, when 
seeking to assess the extent to which an individual state lives up to ideals of the 
green state, such decisions play a crucial role. By including flexible mechanisms, 
the pressure for greater domestic climate ambition was reduced, thus weakening 
Sweden’s progress towards becoming a green state. Had a more biocentric 
commitment been present, Sweden would have employed flexible mechanisms 
as additional tools, rather than including them with the emissions target. Instead, 
little domestic change was required, as a third of the emissions reductions could 
be simply ‘purchased’ through CDM and JI. A fear of being exploited by free 
riders engenders more incremental policy responses to climate change, which 
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in turn stymies the development of the green state. As such, the realization 
of the green state may be more challenging for transboundary environmental 
issues, such as climate change, than more local environmental issues. For overall 
emissions reductions goals, therefore, while Sweden was world-leading, its target 
reflected the principles of weak rather than strong EM.
Renewable energy policy
The production of hydropower and nuclear energy alongside a lack of coal in 
the Swedish energy mix had already placed the state in an unusually low-carbon 
position prior to 2006. Underlining his support for technological investment, 
Moderate Prime Minister Reinfeldt stated alongside European Commission 
President Barroso that climate change could be a ‘profit machine’ for Sweden 
and Europe (Sarasini 2009: 645). Such statements emphasize the pro-market 
foundations of EM; Sweden continued to invest in renewables technology 
over 2006–10, which in turn supported the state’s exports across the world 
(Regeringskansliet 2011). With solar power able to offer little due to Sweden’s 
geography and climate, this section will survey the state’s renewables policy with 
regard to hydropower and wind power, before turning to how nuclear energy 
policy decisions affected renewables development.
By 2006, Sweden already had over 700 large hydropower stations, each with 
capacity over 1.5 MW, while 1200 small stations collectively generated 1.5 TW 
(Wang 2006: 1211). However, as expansion of hydropower is constrained by the 
number of previously untapped free-flowing rivers, by 2006, the possibility of 
expanding hydropower generation into ‘untouched rivers’ was almost impossible 
(Zannakis 2009: 138). As a result, the 2009 Energy Bill sought neither to increase 
nor decrease hydropower provision, despite EU pressure to increase renewables. 
However, Sweden did invest in a small-scale hydropower plant in Malaysia to 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions production, as another example of more 
flexible solutions being favored in Sweden when facing a politically challenging 
domestic situation (Regeringskansliet 2009: 55). In a boost to domestic 
transformation, the Swedish Electricity Certificate System (ECS) was expanded 
in 2009, such that consumers were required to buy renewables certificates 
corresponding to 15.1 percent of their electricity use (cf. ibid.: 42; Chapter 9, this 
volume). The investment in a Malaysian hydropower plant and expansion of the 
ECS reflect small policy changes to a sector that had already received significant 
support for several decades prior to 2006. Regarding hydropower, therefore, I 
argue that Sweden demonstrated the hallmarks of the green state. By balancing 
the expansion of renewable energy production elsewhere via hydropower with 
the protection of remaining rivers, Sweden reflected a strong commitment to 
technological innovation and biocentric values. In order to ‘expand’ renewable 
energy provision, however, Sweden was forced to look beyond hydropower.
Wind power offered the only means for Sweden to increase significantly its 
renewables provision. Decision-making on turbines in the state was already 
highly decentralized, essentially giving veto power to those affected locally by 
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the installations. As Söderholm and Petterson (2011: 523) argued, decentralized 
decision-making made offshore wind production much more favorable than 
onshore installation. Therefore, relying on the market to determine whether 
people would choose to pay a premium for wind power and also accept the 
construction of turbines in their local area would not be effective (Ek 2005: 
1688). As such, the 2009 national planning framework to increase wind power to 
30 TWh by 2020 demonstrated a strong example of leadership on climate change 
by giving greater municipal powers. Additionally, the 2010 Bill (2009/10:1335) 
to extend the existing ECS until 2035 gave greater stability to the market – thus 
stimulating investment – and reflected ambitious and long-term policy-making 
by the Conservative/Liberal Alliance (see Energimyndigheten 2010a: 10).
Without subsidies, however, the Swedish wind market was perceived as too 
unstable to be worthy of investment (Wang 2006: 1217). The Alliance met this 
challenge by investing SEK 20 million directly into a network for wind producers 
each year (Rudberg et al. 2013: 3). The Bills simplifying the concession granting 
process (2008/09:146) and aiding the connection of wind power to the national 
grid (2009/10:51) further introduced stability into the domestic wind market. 
More could have been done to support offshore construction financially (see 
Söderholm and Petterson 2011: 524) – suggesting the financial constraints 
associated more with an environmental welfare state rather than a green state 
– but overall, the Alliance expressed a strong commitment to developing 
wind energy through a variety of measures. As such, the Alliance successfully 
demonstrated principles grounded in strong EM, as required to be considered 
a green state (Christoff 2005: 40). In addition to Sweden’s status as a green 
state regarding hydropower during 2006–10, therefore, Sweden exhibited the 
credentials of the green state towards wind power as well.
Yet an analysis of renewables policy would not be complete without considering 
Sweden’s other dominant energy source; nuclear power. The 1980 moratorium on 
the expansion of nuclear energy necessitated strong support for the renewables 
sector, in order to prevent a shortfall of energy for the growing economy (cf. 
Chapter 9, this volume). However, the decisions of the Conservative/Liberal 
Alliance on nuclear policy during 2006–10 highlighted a sharp divergence 
from its Social Democrat predecessors. The 1980 referendum was seen at the 
time as a partial victory for nuclear power, as the moratorium did not require an 
immediate phase-out, such as that of Austria in 1978 (see Marshall 2007: 148; 
Martinovsky and Mareš 2012: 349). Moreover, the fears over nuclear safety that 
once dominated the environmental-political agenda were replaced during the 
1990s by the threat of climate change. This reprioritization posed a dilemma; 
Nordhaus (1997: 44) argued in 1997 that “[i]f Sweden chooses to phase out its 
nuclear power plants, meeting… [its Kyoto Protocol] commitment will go from 
difficult to near impossible.” As such, nuclear power rapidly regained acceptance 
in a new guise as a climate-friendly energy source (Sailor et al. 2000).
The Conservative/Liberal Alliance reflected the change of perception towards 
nuclear power as a low-carbon energy source in 2009. The government overturned 
the 1980 moratorium on Sweden’s nuclear portfolio enabling the construction of 
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replacement reactors for pre-existing plants (see Sarasini 2009: 639). With the 
Centre Party and Christian Democrats having previously expressed opposition to 
nuclear power, low electricity prices were cited as a key factor in their decision 
(see Zannakis 2009: 141). The desire to reduce prices via nuclear power in order 
to protect industry does not bear the hallmarks of strong EM outlined earlier 
(Eckersley 2004: 76). While nuclear power may enable emissions per unit of 
electricity to be reduced, the energy source does not facilitate a reduction in 
overall consumption. As Eckersley (ibid.: 77) argues regarding the green state, 
“many industries are inherently environmentally degrading, such as the nuclear 
and fossil fuel industries, and therefore must be phased out rather than merely 
modernized.” Furthermore, by enabling newer, more efficient nuclear power 
stations to replace older reactors, the need to invest in further renewables was 
reduced. Therefore, the nuclear U-turn significantly dented the likelihood of 
Sweden going beyond its 50 percent renewables target. The U-turn can thus be 
seen as a missed opportunity in hastening the development of the green state. 
Regarding renewable energy policy overall, while hydropower and wind power 
reflected a successful merger of biocentric values with technological innovation, 
Sweden remained an ambitious ‘environmental welfare state’ due to the U-turn 
over nuclear energy production.
Energy efficiency
Improvements in energy efficiency are problematic with regard to the green state, 
as improved energy efficiency does not necessarily entail a reduction in overall 
emissions. When seeking to mitigate climate change, it is vital that overall 
emissions are reduced, rather than their production simply becoming more 
efficient, if a state is to progress from an environmental welfare state to a green 
state (Eckersley 2004: 76). With a low population density and low temperatures, 
Swedish energy consumption is likely to be higher than that of other states. As 
with the previously discussed policy areas, the Conservative/Liberal Alliance 
ensured that Sweden remained a pioneer by building on existing ambition, but did 
not facilitate significant structural transformations. This incremental ambition 
will be analyzed regarding the state’s policy decisions on district heating, industry 
and housing.
First, Sweden generates much of its heating and some of its electricity from 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) (cf. Chapter 9, this volume). Almost half 
of houses are heated using district heating, with around half of this energy 
sourced from biomass (Jewert 2012: 15). Increasing the percentage provided by 
biofuels would reduce the greenhouse gas production resulting from CHP. As the 
Government stated in 2009 (Regeringskansliet 2009: 6), “[d]istrict heating has 
been … crucial in enabling national policy instruments for renewable energy to 
bring about the extensive phasing-out of fossil fuels.” CHP electricity generation 
grew steadily from 11.43 TWh in 2006 to 15.07 TWh by 2011, yet it can be 
argued that this was more to do with previous policies than Alliance leadership 
(Eurostat 2011). Sweden failed to implement the policies that had led Finland to 
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becoming a world leader in biofuel production (see Ericsson et al. 2004). Indeed, 
there were no further policies to hasten the transition towards biofuels during 
2006–10, suggesting that while energy efficiency in CHP was not undermined, 
the reduction in absolute consumption that is necessary to translate weak EM 
into its stronger form (Eckersley 2004: 76), was neglected.
Second, a voluntary program for energy efficiency in energy-intensive industry 
was introduced in 2005, in which companies were exempted from the national 
energy tax for five years in exchange for implementing an energy management 
system (see Energimyndigheten 2011). As such, from December 2009, energy 
audits in energy-intensive companies were subsidized by up to 50 percent (with 
a maximum SEK 3 billion budget overall). However, the government was 
reluctant to force businesses to cut emissions too quickly for fear of harming 
competitiveness. For example, while the original program reduced emissions by 
around 1.45 TWh across 180 power-intensive industries, its successor featured 
only 90 such industries (Swedish Institute 2013). As a result, the program showed 
all the hallmarks of EM by facilitating industry reductions, but failed to introduce 
a state-required obligation to make significant overall cuts. Moreover, the 
scheme essentially placed a price on emissions, whereby companies could simply 
pay to continue existing energy practices, rather than acknowledge an intrinsic 
value for nature. With industry representing around 45 percent of the country’s 
electricity consumption, the reduction of emissions in this sector was crucial to 
overall greenhouse gas levels, yet few policies were developed over the period. As 
such, protection of the status quo for industry – and the jobs and profits it offered 
– continued to be the dominant paradigm around which the Alliance based its 
policies, reflecting the lack of biocentric values.
Finally, two new building efficiency policies were introduced in 2008. Prior 
to 2006, Sweden had already possessed ambitious housing standards, whereby 
renovated buildings needed to meet the same efficiency requirements as new 
buildings. The first of the Conservative/Liberal Alliance’s responses was a new 
energy declaration law – in force since January 1, 2008 – that built upon an EU 
Directive and was designed to raise awareness of a building’s energy consumption 
(see Swedish Institute 2013). The second was the first National Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan or NEEAP (a successor followed in 2011), set in November 2008 
that sought to realize energy savings of 41 TWh by 2016 across buildings and 
also transport and small industries (SOU 2008: 11). However, the Alliance 
did not formulate a plan to support zero energy buildings, indicating a similar 
complacency to that found regarding industrial efficiency policies (see WWF 
2010). Housing therefore represented another area of incremental improvements, 
when significant policy changes were needed to reduce overall consumption 
rather than merely improve efficiency while building more houses and watching 
energy consumption within these houses rise.
As such, it can be seen that the government of 2006–10 built on pre-existing 
efficiency policies rather than reversing them, thus incrementally increasing 
climate ambitions. Yet in many ways these exploited rather than consolidated 
Sweden’s existing status as a pioneer, thus failing to continue previously high 
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levels of ambition at the same rate. Sweden’s high proportion of renewable energy 
arguably lessened the pressure to reduce consumption of electricity. Overall, 
Sweden performed poorly regarding efficiency throughout the period, and by 
2011, total energy consumption in Sweden was still 55 percent above the EU 
average at 5.1 ton per capita, while electricity consumption per capita was around 
2.5 times higher than the EU average (ABB 2013). As such, Sweden’s attitude to 
energy efficiency – despite a call for a 20 percent improvement by 2020 and the 
biocentric views of 90 percent of its population – prioritized industry and growth 
over a reduction in consumption. Indeed, Sweden’s continued high consumption 
levels placed the state at the less ambitious end of the ‘environmental welfare 
state’ capacity, let alone close to progressing to the green state.
Transport policy
Since the oil crisis of 1973, Sweden has sought to develop alternative fuels to 
support its domestic infrastructure, which is heavily reliant on the transportation 
sector (Hillman and Sandén 2008: 1287). Due to its location on the ‘edge’ of 
Europe, cheap transportation is crucial for the Swedish economy. As a result, 
transport remains the fastest growing sector regarding emissions in Sweden 
(Åkerman and Höjer 2006: 1944) and accounted for around 40 percent of 
Swedish CO2 emissions in 2008 (Friberg 2008: 171). Despite a growth in the use 
of biofuels that has given Sweden the largest fleet of hybrid vehicles in the world, 
transportation remains heavily dependent upon fossil fuels, which in turn makes 
Sweden dependent on imports (Nordic Energy 2012). However, as Lindfeldt 
et al. (2010: 1843) argue, Sweden “is comparably rich in terms of biomass and 
renewable electricity… [meaning that] an import-independent road transport 
system based on renewable energy sources is realistic.” More than 75 percent 
of all person kilometers travelled in Sweden were made by car in 2010 (ibid.: 
1840), ensuring that small changes in this crucial sector could make a significant 
difference to emissions. At the national level, some progress was made during the 
period that reflected strong EM, but the norm of individual freedom and the role 
of market incentives to drive policy decisions maintained the dominance of car 
ownership and thus ensured that overall consumption remained high (Zannakis 
2009: 187).
The most significant policy to reduce car emissions was the April 2007 
introduction of a SEK 10,000 rebates on all purchases of ‘environmentally 
friendly’ hybrid cars. By September 2008, such vehicles accounted for 41 percent 
of Swedish new car sales. This approach again highlighted the presence of the 
principles of EM in policy decisions, as individuals’ preferences in the market 
were allowed to shape the number of green vehicles in the national fleet (albeit 
with some direction from the state). Indeed, by encouraging individuals to buy 
new cars, Sweden offered a classic techno-fix to the issue, rather than seeking 
to radically change lifestyle behaviors regarding transportation. Moreover, in 
December 2008, it was announced that SEK 875 million would be provided to 
facilitate research and development of second-generation biofuels and other 
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energy sources over a period of three years by the government, again demonstrating 
a long-term commitment to renewable transport policies, with the potential 
bonus of increasing exports (Energimyndigheten 2010b). By requiring all biofuels 
used in transport to be sustainable in line with the Renewable Energy Directive, 
a more top-down, regulatory approach was also developed by the government, 
which sought to facilitate a reduction in overall emissions production.
It can be argued that Swedish transport policy between 2006 and 2010 
demonstrated innovative policies at the national level. These policies represented 
a mixture of theoretical underpinnings, from the more ecological modernization-
aligned pro-market and individualized focus of the tax rebate for green vehicles 
and research into biofuel technologies, to the more biocentric principles of 
strong EM that ensured that all biofuels be proved sustainable. Therefore, steps 
were taken towards reducing emissions in the sector responsible for the largest 
share of Swedish CO2 emissions. Yet these steps were not sufficient to transform 
Sweden into a green state during 2006–10. The Government has estimated that 
emissions from the transport sector will continue to increase between 2007 and 
2020 (Regeringskansliet 2009: 10), meaning that while efficiency was improving, 
overall consumption was not. The overall share of biofuels – although growing 
– remained small (Lindfeldt et al. 2010: 1840). As such, the findings in this 
section support Åkerman and Höjer’s (2006: 1955) argument that “[i]mproved 
technology in conjunction with renewable fuels is important, but transport 
volume growth also has to be curbed.” As long as car ownership continues to be 
seen as a rite of passage in Sweden, a societal transformation of the kind needed 
to become a green state will not have occurred. Although the transport sector 
demonstrated perhaps the biggest improvement of the four areas explored in this 
chapter, it also remained the area where the most work was needed to reduce 
overall consumption, and thus, during 2006–10, continued to represent the 
principles of weak, rather than strong, EM.
Conclusion
Climate change poses a catastrophic threat to the planet and its inhabitants. Yet 
with the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters almost exclusively capitalist, this 
chapter has sought to assess the extent to which a capitalist economy can become 
a green state. The chapter began by summarizing the principles of ecological 
modernization and the green state. It was argued that while EM may be a crucial 
feature of the green state, a strong version of EM must be pursued, alongside 
biocentric values, such as the protection of remaining river areas and reductions 
in overall consumption levels. This chapter examined the extent to which 
Sweden displayed the characteristics of the green state with regard to the most 
significant environmental threat, climate change. The chapter analyzed policy 
action in each of the four main emissions reductions areas prioritized between 
2006 and 2010, according to the principles of strong EM.
First, the headline goal of the 2009 Energy Bill was the 40 percent 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction target which clearly increased ambition, 
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yet the inclusion of flexible mechanisms enabled ‘business-as-usual’ policies to 
be pursued domestically while exporting reductions abroad. Next, renewable 
energy policy was examined, in which the pro-growth benefits of renewables 
technologies were highlighted by the Prime Minister as well as by policies 
incentivizing their introduction domestically. By not expanding hydropower 
while investing in wind power during 2006–10, Sweden could thus be said to 
reflect the biocentric yet technologically advanced requirements of the green 
state. Yet these developments clashed with the Government’s 2009 U-turn over 
nuclear energy, which tacitly weakened the renewables sector and facilitated 
the continued production of nuclear waste. Thirdly, regarding energy efficiency, 
support for CHP and voluntary measures for reducing emissions in heavy industry 
showed progress, but not at the rate required to see a transformation to the 
green state. To be considered a green state regarding climate change, not only 
should energy efficiency be improved, but overall emissions should be reduced 
significantly. Sweden’s policies did not facilitate such a reduction to take place. 
Finally, transport policy showed the greatest amount of improvement during the 
five year period, thanks to a requirement that all biofuels be renewably sourced 
and the introduction of rebates on environmentally friendly cars. However, 
this quick progress was partially due to the sector’s weak starting point. Carbon 
emissions continued to grow in the Swedish transport sector, ensuring that any 
policy successes were far from sufficient to consider Sweden a green state on the 
issue.
During the first term of the Conservative/Liberal Alliance Government, 
Sweden continued and developed many policy decisions that drew from weak 
EM, while also reflecting some of the principles of strong EM. This mix was 
sufficient to protect Sweden’s status as a climate pioneer, while also offering 
additional development opportunities for its economy via exports, but not 
enough to facilitate a transition from environmental welfare state to green state. 
If Sweden had produced more ambitious policies, however, businesses may have 
moved abroad, while other states could have exploited Sweden’s ambition by 
failing to reduce their greenhouse gases as significantly. These problems reflect 
the challenges faced by a potential green state in responding to transboundary 
issues such as climate change. Future theorization of the green state must therefore 
seek to conceptualize how the framework can respond to transboundary issues. If 
even the most climate-friendly states, such as Sweden, are not yet green states 
regarding climate change, avoidance of the catastrophic two-degree increase in 
global temperature appears unavoidable. Sweden may be a green state regarding 
other environmental policy areas. However, regarding climate change, it appears 
that the argument of Dryzek (et al. 2003: 2) remains valid: “[a]t present there are 
no green states. But some states are greener than others.”
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